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Publications of SPCL

K. Taranov, B. Rothenberger, D. De Sensi, A. Perrig, T. Hoefler:
	NeVerMore: Exploiting RDMA Mistakes in NVMe-oF Storage Applications (In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '22), Nov. 2022) Best Paper Honorable Mention Abstract This paper presents a security analysis of the InfiniBand architecture, a prevalent RDMA standard, and NVMe-over-Fabrics (NVMe-oF), a prominent protocol for industrial disaggregated storage that exploits RDMA protocols to achieve low-latency and high-bandwidth access to remote solid-state devices. Our work, NeVerMore, discovers new vulnerabilities in RDMA protocols that unveils several attack vectors on RDMA-enabled applications and the NVMe-oF protocol, showing that the current security mechanisms of the NVMe-oF protocol do not address the security vulnerabilities posed by the use of RDMA. In particular, we show how an unprivileged user can inject packets into any RDMA connection created on a local network controller, bypassing security mechanisms of the operating system and its kernel, and how the injection can be used to acquire unauthorized block access to NVMe-oF devices. Overall, we implement four attacks on RDMA protocols and seven attacks on the NVMe-oF protocol and verify them on the two most popular implementations of NVMe-oF: SPDK and the Linux kernel. To mitigate the discovered attacks we propose multiple mechanisms that can be implemented by RDMA and NVMe-oF providers. Documents download article:
	BibTeX
@inproceedings{,   author={Konstantin Taranov and Benjamin Rothenberger and Daniele De Sensi and Adrian Perrig and Torsten Hoefler},   title={{NeVerMore: Exploiting RDMA Mistakes in NVMe-oF Storage Applications}},   year={2022},   month={11},   booktitle={Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '22)}, }